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Abstract
This article examines how the European Union (EU) has impacted party politics in 
Poland. Before the 2004 accession, party politics in Poland were turbulent. In this 
period, the EU, as a reference point, helped to create a pro- and anti-EU party cleav-
age. With this impact admitted, the article turns to the post-accession party poli-
tics. Centering on the nationalist Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), 
the article attempts to explore the EU’s impact on the PiS by studying the latter’s 
adaptation preferences. To do so, I employ James N. Rosenau’s political adapta-
tion theory. Central to the article is the argument that since political parties are the 
protagonists in member states’ domestic politics, the EU can only affect the party 
politics in Poland indirectly, but not inconsequentially. Without mandate notwith-
standing, the EU can create bottom-up pressures through civil society; meanwhile, 
since EU norms and political parties’ particular interests are not necessarily incom-
patible, the EU can take the initiatives to make a balance between them through 
policy innovations.
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1 Introduction
After escaping Moscow’s orbit in the late 1980s, Poland has mainly gone through 
three scenarios; namely, the scenarios of democratization (1989–2001), democratic 
consolidation (2005–2014)1 and autocratization (2015–present).2 In each scenario, 
the European Union (EU) serves as a significant if not the sole reference point.
Concerning party politics, their nature is characterized by the left–right cleavage 
in Western Europe. However, such party cleavage is ambiguous in Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE) in general and in Poland in particular (Morlino 2001: 93). In his 
categorization of CEE’s political parties, Agh (1998) differentiated nationalist par-
ties from the populist strands and labeled them as neo-traditionalist and national-
populist parties, respectively. Moreover, Agh believed that nationalist and populist 
parties are the “twin phenomena” of the “authoritarian renewal” in the early 1990s 
(1998: 62). That being so, although both nationalist and populist parties are anti-EU 
in kind, they vary in degree: whereas the nationalist party is moderate, and, hence, 
center-right, the national-populist party is radical and extreme right.
As to pro-EU parties, although Agh did not give such a label, he, however, 
observed that there slowly emerged the political elites “with a strong European com-
mitment turning against both neo-traditionalism and national-populism” (Agh 1998: 
69). With hindsight, since the elites later established political parties and made 
themselves “fit the increasingly attractive ‘pro-EU’ space on the political spectrum” 
(Vachudova 2008: 865), the parties the elites established can be conveniently taken 
as pro-EU parties in the article.
The article zeros in on the party politics in Poland. Although a generalization of 
CEE’s party politics vis-à-vis the EU is not impossible, the generalization as such 
risks neglecting different paces and trajectories of party politics in the region. With 
this in mind, the article centers on Poland, which spearheaded the third wave of 
democratization, but lagged behind other CEE countries in pace.
1 Subject to different standards, the delineation of democratic consolidation is a complex and contro-
versial issue in all post-communist countries. As far as Poland is concerned, optimists such as Parrott 
(1997:6) assert that Poland “have reached this watershed, even though controversy persists over the shape 
of the Polish constitution.” However, if “[p]arties and institutionalized party systems are considered 
the fundamental factor conducive to democratic consolidation and the quality of electoral democracy 
in particular” (Markowski 2020: 39), the lengthy low turnout alone is adequate to deny the imminent 
democratic consolidation. In this reading, a clear line can hardly be drawn between democratization and 
democratic consolidation in Poland. In the article, the 2001–2005 period is taken as a transitional joint 
in-between. Firstly, the establishments of the PiS and the PO in 2001 began to stabilize the previous 
turbulent party politics, and such stabilization reached its apogee after the inauguration of the PiS-PO 
competition in 2005. Secondly, the EU accession in 2004 constituted an institutionally symbolic and sig-
nificant “‘ruptura’ with traditionalism-provincialism,” and on the heels of such an institution process is 
democratic consolidation (Agh 1998: 110).
2 Autocratization can also be understood as democratic backslide, but the article favors the former con-
ceptualization. In a way, autocratization, as a concept, enables us to study the dynamic process wherein 
a regime is brought closer to a dictatorship (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019: 1099). Therefore, when the 
backsliding toward authoritarianism, according to Markowski (2020: 46), “notably” began in Poland 
after 2015, it also inaugurated the autocratization scenario.
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The exploration of the EU’s impact on Poland’s party politics takes 1991 as a 
convenient starting point. Although the 1989 Round Table Talk triggered Poland’s 
democratization, it is not until 1991 that Europeanization was inaugurated by the 
association agreement signed between the European Communities and Poland. 
As per the agreement, the European Community and Poland aimed to regularize 
political dialogues, through which to “facilitate Poland’s full integration into the 
community.”3
The party landscape in Poland began to stabilize after the 2001 parliamentary 
election. In 2005, alongside the electoral debacle of the post-communist party, 
the nationalist Law and Justice’s (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), together with the 
pro-EU Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO),4 became the protagonist in 
Poland’s domestic politics. Notably, compared with the PO’s pro-EU commitment, 
the PiS’s nationalist credential, at first glance, seems incompatible with EU norms 
advocating cosmopolitan values.5 Be that as it may, the PiS did not behave so; 
instead, it changed its adaptation preference first by allying with the PO and then 
with populist parties before heading to the present “soft dictatorship” (Kamusella 
2017: 121).
Conventionally, political parties’ behaviors should be explained in domestic set-
tings. However, the domestic setting alone is not adequate to understand the PiS’s 
adaptation preferences stated above. When the conventional wisdom fails in grasp-
ing the complexity of party politics in the EU’s new member states, two compro-
mised approaches stand out. One tends to trivialize or simply neglect the EU’s 
impact; the other turns on the default mode by pigeonholing political parties into the 
left–right cleavage.
Aiming to understand the driving force behind PiS’s change of adaptation pref-
erences, I employ James Rosenau’s political adaptation theory. With the analytical 
traction, the political adaptation theory can help to reveal the otherwise confusing 
party behaviors. Central to the article is the argument that since political parties 
are the protagonists in member states’ domestic politics, the EU can only affect the 
party politics in Poland indirectly, but not inconsequentially. Without mandate not-
withstanding, the EU can create bottom-up pressures through civil society; mean-
while, since EU norms and political parties’ particular interests are not necessar-
ily incompatible, the EU can take the initiatives to make a balance between them 
through policy innovations.
Before delving into the analysis, both EU governance and Europeanization 
should be delineated. EU governance is an aggregation of EU norms. As a sui gen-
eris administration paradigm, EU governance results from EU integration, and “the 
fundamental feature of EU governance is its ability to construct Europe as something 
3 See Article 2 in the European Union Association Agreement, https ://wits.world bank.org/GPTAD /PDF/
archi ve/EC-Polan d.pdf. Accessed 24 March 2020.
4 After the 2018 local election, the PO created the Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska, KO) by form-
ing the parliamentary coalition with the Modern, the Polish Initiative, and the Greens. Nevertheless, the 
article uses the term “PO” as a general rule.
5 The EU, as a cosmopolitan polity or power, has been studied by Beck and Grande (2007), Saurugger 
(2009) and Eriksen (2019).
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to be governed” (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 139). Similarly, Europeanization can-
not be detached from EU integration, and it refers to the diffusion of policy and 
institution—a process through which ideas and normative standards spread across 
time and space (Börzel and Risse 2012: 5). For member states and their political 
parties, Europeanization is a “meta-power game” (Beck and Grande 2007: 137). 
Affected by the Europeanization mechanisms of conditionality and socialization, all 
actors “must redefine their scope and radius of action, their goals and their strate-
gies” (Beck and Grande 2007: 138).
The remainder of the article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews 
the past literature on the EU’s impact vis-à-vis member states’ political parties. The 
second section examines the political adaptation theory and extends the theory to 
understand political parties’ adaptation preferences. The third section delves into the 
PiS’s adaptation preferences in detail, and the last section concludes by summariz-
ing the article.
2  Literature Review
Political parties are vital institutions for democracy (Dalton and Weldon 2007: 179). 
In new democracies in particular, such as Poland, political parties are essential 
actors for democratization and its consolidation. The same as many CEE countries, 
Poland’s returning to Europe began in the early 1990s.
The literature on Poland’s Europeanization as a candidate state ranges from lead-
ership transformation (Jasiewicz 1997) and party formation (Parrott 1997: 15–21), 
to constitutional development (Batt and Wolczuk 1998: 90–93). On the contrary, 
scholarly attention on the EU’s impact on the political parties in Poland is meager. 
As to the reasons, there are mainly two. One is the lack of or late interest in the 
topics. The research interest in the political party’s vis-à-vis European integration, 
according to Ladrech (2009: 4), only appeared in the late 1970s. Similarly, it was not 
until after the Cold War that people began to heed the governance approach, and “[t]
he ending of bipolarity also made it possible for more collective management of the 
world’s problems” (Yu 2019: 193).
The other reason is the theoretical incompatibility between EU norms and party 
politics. The EU is a “post-sovereign normative power” (Merlingen 2007: 438), it, 
as a new governance variant, “faces a particularly acute set of challenges in natural-
izing itself” (McNamara 2015: 1). By contrast, political parties in most countries are 
still state-centric in nature. Conventionally, political parties should and have to draw 
their legitimacy in domestic arenas.
For researchers trying to look elsewhere for inspiration, mainstream integra-
tion theories, unfortunately, cannot afford the luxury of doing so. From func-
tionalism and intergovernmentalism to constructivism, all theories take states 
as a fixed reference point. Neofunctionalists prioritize the spillover effect, and 
integration is taken as a continuous process, wherein “political actors in sev-
eral distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre” (emphasis in original, Haas 1968: 
16). Highlighting the autonomy of states, liberal intergovernmentalists gravitate 
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to intergovernmental bargaining and assert that “the pattern of state preferences 
and power—in particular the opportunity costs of foregoing agreement—is the 
decisive determinant of specific agreements” (Moravcsik 1998: 52–53). For con-
structivists, the state has a significant, if not exclusive, role. Therefore, skewing 
toward the concept, socialization notwithstanding, constructivists emphasize that, 
in the process of socialization, “domestic politics plays a key, if under-theorized 
role” (Checkel 2006: 25).
Having said that, the study of the EU’s impact on member states’ party poli-
tics mainly has two pathways. One focuses on the transnational party groups in the 
European Parliament (EP) (Hix and Lord 1997; Whitaker 2005; Hanley 2008). The 
Europeanization of political parties in the EU arena gained momentum after the first 
direct EP elections in 1979 (Ladrech 2009: 4). However, to orthodoxy statists, the 
party politics in the EP is no more than  the sideshow of member states’ domestic 
politics—the presence of party elites is nothing but a failed attempt to reveal the 
“broader domestic party political dynamics” (Ladrech 2009: 5).
The other pathway treats the EU as one of the many variants. Nevertheless, since 
member states’ political parties cannot be uprooted from the domestic setting, the 
EU’s impact evaluated so is not sanguine. Therefore, for Peter Mair (2000), Euro-
peanization only has a “limited impact” on Western European countries’ political 
parties. Be that as it may, political parties take a late departure in Poland; the EU’s 
impact in Poland does not necessarily follow the same trajectory as that in Western 
Europe. In other words, although the acquis communautaire has narrowed down the 
policy space in member states (Dorussen and Nanou 2006; Mair 2007), the “adapta-
tional pressures” are likely to lead to different party behaviors in Poland (Börzel and 
Risse 2007: 492). Other than that, political parties’ adaptations do not always lead 
to passive convergence or harmonization (Ladrech 2002: 395). Among others, the 
PiS’s increasingly authoritarian tendency is one of the archetypical examples.
For those aiming to evaluate the EU’s impact on Poland’s party politics, the 2005 
elections offered the required feasibility. After the 2005 elections, Poland’s party 
landscape began to stabilize, and the embryonic two-party system formed. In regard 
to the PiS and the PO in the embryonic two-party system, Szczerbiak and Bil evalu-
ated the EU’s impact on them in 2009 and concluded pessimistically. According to 
them, although “‘Europe’ has been assimilated successfully into the logic of Pol-
ish domestic party politics,” the impact of EU membership on Polish parties was 
“rather minimal” (Szczerbiak and Bil 2009: 450, 455). By minimal, Szczerbiak and 
Bil explored the EU’s impact by looking for how the status of the role of “Euro-
pean policy specialists” had been strengthened and whether there are “new party 
organizational structures specifically to consider European policy” (Szczerbiak and 
Bil 2009: 449).
It is worth pointing out that Szczerbiak and Bil’s above analysis, with hindsight, 
set a bar which is too high to give it a fair evaluation. For one thing, the EU has no 
mandate to impose legal obligations on member states’ political parties. For another 
thing, when the EU’s impact has to choose the conduit of civil society, it takes time 
for civil society to generate adequate bottom-up pressures with which to affect the 
party politics in Poland. Therefore, not only is such an evaluation premature, but 
it has also underestimated the EU’s impact. With this point in mind, I will reassess 
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the EU’s impact on the political parties in Poland by examining the PiS’s adaptation 
behaviors from 2001 to 2019.
Not least, to measure the EU’s impact on political parties, political parties’ 
adaptation behavior should be differentiated from the act of learning. Whereas the 
ultimate purpose will be redefined in learning, the emphasis of adaptation “is on 
altering means of action, not ends” (Haas 1990: 3). Moreover, insofar as adaptation 
asks for fewer changes or less degree of change, “[t]he very nature of institutions is 
such that the dice are loaded in favor of the less demanding behavior associated with 
adaptation” (Haas 1990: 37).
3  Political Adaptation Theory
To understand the general patterns of nation-states’ foreign policy choices, Rosenau 
(1981) developed the political adaptation theory. The political adaptation theory 
starts with the concept of “essential structures.” According to Rosenau (1981: 38), 
essential structures refer to “the interrelated patterns that constitute the basic politi-
cal, economic, and social life of a national society.” In any nation-state, its essen-
tial structure allows a limited degree of change. Meanwhile, although the political 
adaptation theory applies to a range of actors, such as individuals, parties, states, or 
societies, Rosenau only expounded it in nation-states. That being so, to explore the 
dynamics behind political parties’ adaptation preferences, I will review the theory 
before extending it to understand political parties’ behaviors.
3.1  Nation States and Adaptation
Taking nation-state as the point of reference, Rosenau divides changes into two 
kinds: internal and external changes, each of which has personnel, political, and 
socioeconomic dimensions. The personnel dimension “refers to the shifts in the 
identity of the people who occupy the governmental and non-governmental leader-
ship roles” (Rosenau 1981: 44). The political dimension occurs either between gov-
ernment officials or between government officials and the citizenry. Concerning the 
socioeconomic dimension, it includes a broader domain ranging from the change of 
production modes to the enactment of new welfare policies.
In line with the above delineation, Rosenau further categorizes nation-states’ 
status quo into four styles. Namely, the convulsive style, the spirited style, the 
deliberative style, and the habitual style. The convulsive style is characterized 
by high internal and high external changes. “The combination of high change at 
home and abroad tends to make established policies and procedures unreliable” 
(Rosenau 1981: 49). On the contrary, the habitual style has low internal and low 
external changes. As far as the necessity of changes is concerned, “the rouitinized 
decision-making processes of governments will suffice to cope with the course 
of public and world affairs” (Rosenau 1981: 47). If the convulsive and habitual 
styles are the opposite endpoints of the spectrum, sitting between are the spirited 
and deliberate styles. The spirited style has low external change and high internal 
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change. In contrast, the deliberate style has the reverse paradigm; namely, the 
fluctuation of external change is high, and that of internal change low.
Foreign policy is “any behavior that a national society directed toward its exter-
nal environment which, through feedback, does or does not contribute to keeping 
the fluctuations in its essential structure within acceptable limits” (Rosenau 1981: 
58). In this light, foreign policies appropriately adapted to changes can help to 
contain fluctuations without threatening essential structures. Applying the above 
adaptation styles to understand nation-states’ foreign policy preferences, Rosenau 
(1981: 58–59) presents four types of adaptation position:
Acquiescent adaptation a society can attempt to keep its essential structures by 
making them consistent with the changes and demands emanating from its pre-
sent environment.
Intransigent adaptation a society can seek to render its environment consistent 
with its present structures.
Promotive adaptation a society can attempt to shape the demands of its present 
structures and its present environment to each other.
Preservative adaptation a society can seek to live within the limitations that its 
present structures and its present environment have imposed on each other.
A nation-state’s adaptation preference is not static, and the necessity to adapt 
mainly depends on how the essential structure can be sustained. Therefore, to 
help to understand such necessity, four variables have been given: the individ-
ual, governmental, societal, and systematic variables. Contingent on the relative 
potency of each set of variables, nation-states’ adaptation positions can be trig-
gered to change.
Briefly reviewed, the individual variables encompass decision-makers’ value, tal-
ents, and prior experiences. The governmental variables refer to the influence of a 
government’s structure on foreign policy choices. The societal variables include the 
non-governmental aspects of society, such as the degree of national unity and the 
level of industrialization. Concerning the systemic variables, it includes “any nonhu-
man aspects of a society’s external environment or any actions occurring abroad that 
condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials” (Rosenau 1980: 
129). With the high-low axis added, the potency of each set of variables can, in a 
way, reveal the tendency of nation-states’ adaptation preferences (see Table 1).
Table 1  Relative potencies of four clusters of independent variables as sources of national adaptation
Source: Rosenau (1981: 81)
Relative potency Acquiescent adapta-
tion
Intransigent adapta-
tion
Promotive adapta-
tion
Preservative adap-
tation
HIGH Systemic Societal Individual Systemic
Societal
Governmental
LOW Societal Systemic Systemic Individual
Individual Individual Societal
Governmental Governmental Governmental
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Notably, in the systemic variables, geographical proximity is one of the most evi-
dent and decisive factors. When the geographical factor plays a primary role in the 
systemic variables, the potency of the other three variables will be eclipsed. In con-
sequence, the acquiescent position stands out. If it is the societal variables that play 
a more crucial role than the other three, it points to the intransigent position. In the 
promotive position, the individual variables have a relatively higher potency than the 
other three; by contrast, in the preservative position, the individual variables have a 
relatively lower potency.
Since the relative potency of each set of variables is in constant fluctuation, so 
is the probability of the change of adaptation position. With all probabilities con-
sidered, each of the four adaptation positions has three designations. According to 
Rosenau (1981: 87), three out of twelve possibilities occur in high probability, and 
all three are designated to the preservative position. As to the reasons behind this 
coincidence, it can be attributed to nation-states’ burgeoning nationalism and their 
unwillingness to bargain (Rosenau 1981: 84–85). Three pathways of high probabil-
ity aside, another three are less likely to occur. One is the pathway from the acqui-
escent position to the promotive position. The other two have the same preservative 
departure, but one ends in the acquiescent position, the other the promotive position. 
Except for the above six possibilities, the other six are hardly possible to occur.
3.2  Political Parties and Adaptation
As stated, although the political adaptation theory can also apply to other actors, 
Rosenau has mainly used it to explain nation-states’ foreign policy preferences. As 
far as political parties are concerned, he only cursorily mentions that electoral com-
petition has a “much lesser extent” influence on internal political changes than that 
can be released by coups d’état (Rosenau 1981: 43).
Party politics and political parties’ adaptation preferences are worthy of studying 
for two reasons. One is because the ruling party or party coalition steers domestic 
politics in most countries. Whenever in power, political parties are “central actors in 
the workings of national democratic governance” (Ladrech 2007: 956). In particular, 
in a one-party country, the political party can be the only legitimate one to do so 
through the proxy of government. The other is of the urgency of such a study. When 
populist politics began gaining momentum in recent years, the CEE countries were 
the hotspots of populist revival (cf. Pirro 2014). In an authoritarian regime, the long 
arm of party politics plays a decisive role in formulating state politics. In this light, 
to better understand an authoritarian regime’s behaviors in the international arena, 
we should also take into account the ruling political party’s adaptation position.
Notwithstanding nation-states intertwine with political parties in the national 
arena, they, as the institutionalized forms of collective interests, differ in size and 
the degree of homogeneity of political interests. The nation-state is the biggest com-
munity in the present state-centric framework, and the interests within are heteroge-
neous. As to political parties, they are subunits in nation-states and mostly organ-
ized out of the same or similar political interest. Insofar as the adaptation capability 
is concerned, “political entities, and especially large communities and societies, 
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are highly adaptive” (Rosenau 1981: 9). In this light, nation-states should be more 
capable in terms of adaptation than political parties. Meanwhile, political interests 
in nation-states are more heterogeneous; by contrast, political parties are mostly 
formed out of a particular set of interests, while the narrower scope of interests has 
confined their flexibility of adaptation.
More fundamentally, since legal sovereignty can guarantee their existence in the 
contemporary international setting, nation-states are less worried about the survival 
issue; as to political parties, there is no such ready-to-take provision in any given 
national arena. As a result, political parties ill-functioned are more likely to recede 
into debilitation or dissolution. Especially in new democracies, such as Poland in the 
early 1990s, the come-and-go of political parties was even more frequent. Further-
more, due to the lack of such provision, political parties striving to keep themselves 
afloat compete with each other ferociously in electoral competitions. When elections 
held at intervals are a matter of life and death, each election is a litmus test for politi-
cal parties’ adaptation capability.
Taken together, compared with nation-states, political parties are smaller in size, 
homogenous in interest, and lower in terms of the odds of survival. Therefore, politi-
cal parties’ adaptation preferences have two comparatively different features of their 
own. Firstly, political parties pursuing the narrow scopes of interests have less flex-
ibility to change their adaptation preferences. Thus, for any political party pursuing 
national power, the political stance is pivotal. Secondly, and seemly paradoxically, 
out of the sheer worry about their survival, political parties are inclined to interpret 
their agenda flexibly if not entirely freely.6 Among others, the PiS in Poland, as will 
be expounded later in detail, is exceptionally skilled in balancing between the politi-
cal stance and the adaptive flexibility.
In the European setting, the EU constituted and still constitutes a new reality for 
new member states’ political parties. As one of the significant elements in systemic 
variables, the EU’s impact on member states’ political parties, conceivably, was 
compelling, be it positively or negatively. The pressure emanating from the EU lost 
its intensity when candidate states acquired the membership. Nevertheless, the con-
tinuous Europeanization and the growing power of civil society still play a role in 
holding political parties accountable, albeit of less intensity. Therefore, it is no exag-
geration to say that the systemic variables have an all-time high potency, and major 
political parties in the candidate states were mainly at the acquiescent position.
Departing from the acquiescent position, political parties’ change of adaptation 
preferences has two possibilities. One is the pathway of high probability. The sys-
tematic variables aside, if both the societal and governmental variables also gain rel-
atively high potency, the acquiescent position will be more likely to be shifted to the 
preservative position. Whenever a political party is set to the preservative position, 
it is inclined to adapt to EU norms by preserving the existent balance at a particular 
point. The other is the pathway of low probability. When the individual variables 
surpass the systemic variables in terms of relative potency, the acquiescent position 
6 In theory, political parties can adapt to new reality either by shifting their interest from the old to the 
new ones, or by merely shoving new reality into the existent framework.
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will turn to the promotive variant. In the promotive position, the leader of the rul-
ing political party tends to reach a new balance between EU norms and the party 
interest.
4  PiS’s Adaptation: Janus‑Faced Party Behaviors
The prospective EU membership has been “both a passively influential set of incen-
tive structures which have shaped and conditioned the behaviour of Polish politi-
cal elites, and an active agent of political reform” (Steves 2001: 340). In the pre-
accession context, the PiS established in 2001 was no exception. Before the 2005 
elections, not only did the PiS have to accept the ex-ante EU membership, but also 
heed the imminent threat emanating from populist parties as well. Navigating “the 
political discourses of technocracy, populism, and nationalism” (Grzymala-Busse 
and Innes 2003: 67), the PiS first allied with the pro-EU PO, and then turned to the 
populist camp before heading to the soft dictatorship in 2015. As a nationalist party, 
the flexibility of PiS’s adaptation is as remarkable as mythical. To unravel the myth, 
PiS’s party behaviors will be examined against the ex-ante EU backdrop.
4.1  PiS’s Journey to Soft Dictatorship
Before examining the PiS’s adaptation preferences, we have to note three points. 
First, Poland has long been afflicted by low voter turnout. Although it recorded a 
historic high rate in the 2019 parliamentary election (61.74%, see Table  2), low 
turnout had been a lengthy problem in Poland, and it constitutes, to borrow Dwight 
Dean’s (1960) word, an “anomaly” in a democracy.7
Table 2  National election results in Poland, 2005–2019
Source: Compiled by the author from the National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja 
Wyborcza), https ://wybor y.gov.pl
a After a failed negotiation with the PO, the PiS formed a coalition government with the populist SRP and 
LPR in 2006
b After the retreat of the SRP, the PiS’s coalition government dissolved; the PO formed a coalition gov-
ernment with the pro-EU Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL)
c The PO kept the coalition with the PSL
National elections 2005 2007 2010 2011 2015 2019
Parliamentary 
(with voter 
turnout)
PiSa (40.57%) POb (53.88%) POc (48.92%) PiS (50.92%) PiS (61.74%)
Presidential PiS PO PiS PiS
7 In the analysis of political apathy in US politics, Dwight Dean (1960: 186) claims, “In a democracy, 
it is an anomaly that only 50 percent to 65 percent of the adult citizens participate even to the minimum 
extent of voting in presidential elections.”
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Secondly, it pertains to PiS’s paternalist nature. As observed by Agh (1998: 62), 
“The moderate conservatives focus on the representation of the whole ‘nation,’ 
by which they mean the national state in a paternalistic-statist approach.” With no 
exception, the PiS squarely fit the paternalist type; its party programs are built “on 
the belief of a strong and sovereign Poland with a strong leader and a paternalistic 
state” (Lázár 2015: 224). One step further, due to the low turnout, the constrained 
potency of the societal variables has further strengthened the PiS’s paternalistic 
nature.
Thirdly, only through winning elections can the PiS have the chance to set the 
domestic agenda. Notwithstanding its emergence in 2001, Poland was not prepared 
for the PiS’s administration before the SLD’s electoral debacle in 2005. In between, 
the PiS had to keep itself afloat vigilantly. At that stage, alongside the relative high 
potency of the EU in the systemic variables, the defunct societal variables, the sup-
pressed governmental and individual variables had driven the PiS to the acquiescent 
position, albeit not ideally.8
Alongside Poland’s accession in 2004, the PiS had no other choices but to admit 
and accept the EU’s impact, albeit in a passive manner. Be that as it may, the pas-
sive acceptance did not necessarily imply that the PiS could ally with the pro-EU PO 
automatically. Under the SLD administration, it was when it aimed to manage popu-
list parties’ ascendency that the PiS chose to do so actively. Even so, the alliance 
was short-lived. Right before the 2005 elections, the core difference immediately 
pitted the PiS against the PO. Concerning the disparate interests:
The PO emphasized its commitment to individual liberties, procedural democ-
racy, and entrepreneurial freedom as the basis of economic growth. The PiS, 
on the contrary, stressed the need to nourish a national community based on 
shared values and traditions, with the principles of social solidarity as the 
basis for public policy. It also utilized expressions of economic nationalism, 
often with a Euro-skeptic bent (Jasiewicz 2008: 8).
Going one step further, after 2005, the PiS turned to the populist camp for sup-
port. As a result, the PiS’s Eurosceptic tone was inevitably intensified (Markowski 
and Tucker 2010: 528). To explain the PiS’s growing Eurosceptic inclination and the 
subsequent alliance with the populist camp, it is worth examining the Polishness that 
the PiS frequently claimed and persistently clung to.
No matter how elusive it may sound or seem, the Polishness had been underlined 
by the Polish language and Catholic belief in the 1997 constitution. In regard to the 
PiS, it had a two-step stratagem to defend the Polishness. Firstly, the PiS criticized 
the Third Republic after 1989 as “un-Polish, non-national”; subsequently, it aimed 
to build the Fourth Republic (IV Rzeczpospolita) exclusively on the Polishness.9 As 
elucidated by Frances Millard (2006: 1016):
8 The PiS acquiesced EU integration with a harsh standpoint on agrarian issues, such as subsidy and 
land-purchasing (Zuba 2009: 332).
9 The first Polish republic lasted from 1569 to 1795; the second, 1918–1939.
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The Fourth Republic would experience moral cleansing through deep lustra-
tion, anti-corruption measures, and reaffirmation of Catholic values; its new 
Constitution would repair the state; it would heal society with a social con-
tract, including fundamental changes in social and economic policy. This new 
beginning would rid Poland of the enduring legacy of the Round Table negoti-
ated in 1989 between the regime and Solidarity.
After 2005, the relative potency of PiS’s governmental and individual vari-
ables increased concomitantly. Concerning the EU factor in the systemic variables, 
although the EU in the PiS administration had a weakened role, its potency had not 
become irrelevant. By antagonizing the EU, the PiS headed in the Eurosceptic direc-
tion. For instance, after rejecting the Charter of Fundamental Rights at the EU Sum-
mit in 2007, the then PiS Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński, took the refusal-to-
sign action as a remarkable achievement for Poland (Wronski 2007: 7).
As reviewed above, the departure from the acquiescent position has two possible 
pathways: one is the high probable preservative position, the other the low probable 
promotive position. The PiS followed the preservative pathway, and this change took 
time to complete. From 2005 to 2014, the PiS witnessed a gradual dissipation of the 
potency of the individual variables.
After winning the 2005 elections, the PiS’s leadership was first undermined by 
the intraparty strife, which led to the high-ranking party members’ rebellion. Later, 
since the allied populist parties were felt as being treated as second-rate entities, the 
resultant resentment led to their retreat from the PiS alliance (Moroska and Zuba 
2010: 4). More tragically, the 2010 Smolensk plane crash resulted in the loss of 96 
high-ranking officials, including the then-president, Lech Kaczyński.
Alongside the erosion of its leadership, the PiS first failed in the 2007 parlia-
mentary election and then the 2010 presidential election. In this period, the relative 
potency of the individual variables was gradually weakened; likewise, the potency 
of the governmental variables decreased as well after the cohabitation period start-
ing from 2007.10 Meanwhile, the relative potency of the systemic variables remained 
high, and the lasting “EU-entry hype” even helped the PO to form a coalition gov-
ernment with the PSL in 2007 (Visvizi and Tokarski 2014: 456).
In explaining why states bandwagon, Schweller (1994: 92) argues, “Like a ball 
rolling down an incline, initial success generates further success, not greater resist-
ance.” Steeped in electoral competitions no less fierce than interstate competitions 
for national interests, party politics, through electoral outcomes, can also set positive 
feedback in motion. Dating back to 2007, the PO added as many as 16 paragraphs of 
EU policy in the election manifesto, which stood in sharp contrast to the absence of 
any EU policy in 2001 and 2005, respectively (Szczerbiak and Bil 2009: 454). By 
playing the EU card, the PO achieved consecutive victories in 2007 and 2010.11
10 Cohabitation refers to the situation “where a president from one party holds power at the same time as 
a prime minister from an opposing party and where the president’s party is not represented in the cabinet 
[or parliament in the Polish case]” (Elgie 2010: 29).
11 Moreover, the PO’s leader at that time, Donald Tusk, was appointed as the President of the European 
Council in 2014.
1 3
Chinese Political Science Review 
If the EU factor was essential for PO’s successive triumphs, the ensuing Euro-
zone crisis turned the tables by favoring the PiS. “The Eurozone crisis and its impli-
cations for the credibility of the single currency increased the transaction costs of 
the policy reform process in Poland, thus reinforcing the negative spillovers already 
in place” (Visvizi and Tokarski 2014: 462). With the support of the populist media, 
such as Radio Maryja,12 The PiS’s “linguistic vulgarisms” ended with a landslide 
victory (Markowski 2016: 1319). Taking more than half of the parliament seats 
(51.09%), the PiS, for the very first time in the post-communist era, formed a major-
ity government.
After the PiS’s victory in 2015, the individual variables exceptionally stood out. 
In Poland, as pointed out by Kamusella, both the Prime Minister and President are 
the nominal leaders, “but de facto they take orders from and invariably bow to the 
will and wishes of the PiS chairman” (Kamusella 2017: 121). After driving Poland 
into the autocratization scenario since 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński, together with the 
Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, “are two of the most frequently cited examples of 
the growth of personalism in European politics. And this expansion is poised to 
accelerate” (Kendall-Taylor et al. 2017: 8).
Overshadowed by the exceptionally high potency of the individual variables not-
withstanding, the potency of systemic variables had been dented by the EU, belea-
guered first by the economic crisis and then by the migrant crisis. Concerning the 
EU’s migrant quota, the PiS refused to make any concession. Even before the EU 
appealed for collective actions, the migrant issue had already been over-politicized. 
Before the 2015 elections, when the then PO government expressed the willingness 
to take 2000 or more refugees, Jarosław Kaczyński acrimoniously blamed Germany 
for “creating…the powerful social magnet for economic immigrants” (Łaszczuk 
2015).
Likewise, the governmental variables after 2015 have also hemorrhaged its 
potency. Among others, the constitutional court crisis had significantly reduced 
the PiS government’s accountability. In the 2015 constitutional court crisis, the PiS 
interpreted Polishness by favoring the narrowly defined party interests and nullified 
the PO’s appointments of three constitutional tribunal judges. Raising awareness of 
the PiS’s recklessness, the European Commission not only launched proceedings 
against Poland under Article 7.1 of the Lisbon Treaty but also warned, “there is a 
clear risk of serious breach of the rule of law in Poland” (European Commission 
2017).
To conclude, after the 2015 elections, both the systemic and governmental vari-
ables were eclipsed by the exceptionally high potency of the individual variables, 
and the societal variables were only partially functional. In consequence, the PiS 
shifted from the preservative position to the promotive position. Notably, although 
the change from the preservative position to the acquiescent position has a certain 
12 Due to the underdeveloped civil society, public media has played a decisive role in party politics. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the PiS intended to control the state media in 2016. https ://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world -europ e-35257 105. Accessed 24 March 2020.
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probability albeit low, this pathway was simply blocked due to the relatively weak-
ening of the EU role in the populist setting.
4.2  Governance Levels of the EU and Polish Parties
Due to its discursiveness and complexity, the level of governance is hard to be 
gauged. As to the measurement of the EU’s impact on party politics in Poland, 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are chosen. In this aspect, the Ven-
ice Commission, as the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional mat-
ters, has also issued the Code of Good Practice (CGP). Although the CGP aims 
“to offer political parties guidelines stemming from the common and best practice 
in Europe” (Venice Commission 2009: 5), it is more of guidance on paper than in 
practice. Therefore, notwithstanding the emphasis on the principles of Rule of law, 
Democracy, Non-discrimination, Transparency and openness, the CGP has offered 
no means for evaluation. By contrast, the WGI has specific parameters to understand 
the quality of governance.
The WGI was produced by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (2019), and 
financed and publicized by the World Bank. Due to the lack of a better alterna-
tive, the WGI has been widely used by donor governments to monitor aid recipient 
countries’ governance quality (Thomas 2010: 34). Although there is no causal link 
between the CGP and the WGI, their underlying principles overlap in one way or 
another. Specifically, the WGI’s indicator of Rule of Law has been selected as one of 
the standards for the CGP (Venice Commission 2016: 35).
In the WGI, governance is broadly defined as “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al. 2011: 222), which com-
prises three dimensions, as below:
(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced;
(b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies;
(c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.
Furthermore, each of the above three areas has two measures: (a) Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; (b) Govern-
ment Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality; (c) Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption 
(Kaufmann et al. 2011: 223).
Insofar as the feasibility of such measurement is concerned, two extra points 
should be noted. Firstly, the governance level of the EU (see Fig. 1) in the article 
has been calibrated to the average level of the EU’s founding member states, which 
include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Germany (then West 
Germany). “The full members at the core of the EU - its founding members, orig-
inally-define the EU’s standard of good governance” (Schimmelfennig 2016: 793). 
In each founding member state, its governance is calculated by averaging the values 
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of all six indicators, and the value of each indicator ranges from − 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong).13
Secondly, the overall level of governance should be interpreted at intervals. In a 
parliamentary democracy, “governments are composed mainly of the members of 
the elites of those parties which win the elections” (Blondel 2002: 235). In Poland, 
the parliamentary system might be kept decent on paper. However, it has been 
deformed in practice—the arm’s length between party and government has been 
shortened or entirely cut, especially in the PiS government. Therefore, Poland’s 
governance level can largely reflect the ruling political party’s governance level. In 
sequence, Poland’s governance level in 2005–2007 mirrored the PiS’s performance, 
and that in 2007–2010 reflected the party governance level in the cohabitation 
period; the PO’s in 2010–2015; the PiS’s, again, from 2015 onward.
As revealed by the above graph, the EU’s governance level decreased slightly 
from 2005 to 2018 with the growing populism and the concomitant resentment 
resulting from EU’s austerity rules as possible reasons to explain the drop (Börzel 
2016: 17). Concerning the overall governance level in Poland, it lags behind that of 
the EU. The most significant gap occurred in 2006 (0.85) when Poland’s govern-
ance level fell to the lowest point (0.49). Not coincidently, it was in 2006 that the 
PiS organized a coalition government with the populist camp. From 2007 onward, 
Poland’s governance level more or less kept an upward trend until it reached a peak 
in 2014 (0.88). Concomitantly, the smallest gap has also been recorded in the same 
(0.43).14
After 2015, the PiS had no more need to negotiate coalition partners, and its 
increasing authoritarian inclination has resulted in a continuous fall of governance 
level. Be that as it may, it is worthy of pointing out that the PiS’s governance level 
in 2018 (0.65) overtook that in 2005 (0.56). To explain the improvement, the EU’s 
impact, among others, is not inconsequential.
Lastly, as also admitted by Kaufmann et al. (2011: 242), “any observed empirical 
measure of governance will only be an imperfect proxy for the broader dimensions 
of governance that it reflects, and the data informing the WGI are no exception.” 
Considering the complexity of party politics in Poland, we have to admit that the 
above graph has not revealed the whole picture of Poland’s party governance lev-
els. Nevertheless, the WGI, an analytical lens, has allowed us to examine the other-
wise hardly measurable governance level; hence we shall judge the WGI on its own 
merits.
13 Since the values of all countries concerned are above zero, the minimum bound in Graph 1 starts with 
value zero.
14 Although the smallest gap (0.43) has also been recorded in 2015, as revealed in Graph 1, it is a techni-
cal error. Since the value in the graph follows the rule of two decimal places, the value in 2015 (0.4336) 
is the round-down result, while that in 2014 (0.4255) the round-up result.
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5  Conclusion
Trying to explore the EU’s impact on Poland’s party politics in general and the 
dynamics behind PiS’s party behaviors in particular, I employ Rosenau’s political 
adaptation theory in the article. From its establishment in 2001 to the latest parlia-
mentary election in 2019, the PiS, from the acquiescent position, changed its adapta-
tion preferences at least twice. The first change was from the acquiescent position 
to the preservative position after the 2005 elections. As a result, the PiS, previously 
allying with the PO, turned to the populist camp for support. The second change 
mainly occurred after the 2015 elections. After the historic victory in the parliamen-
tary election, the PiS changed from the preservative position to that of promotive.
Notably, behind each PiS change is the ex-ante backdrop of Europeanization. 
Although the EU aimed to establish certain norms as “consensual knowledge” (Haas 
1997: 326), it, as the second point of reference, could only play an indirect role to 
affect member states’ party politics. Be that as it may, the indirect impact does not 
mean its irrelevance. Firstly, the EU helped to create the pro- and anti-EU party 
cleavage in Poland and now it is in the process of creating bottom-up pressure by 
nurturing the power of civil society in Poland.
As an analytical framework, Rosenau’s political adaptation theory can explain 
the otherwise seemly capricious party behaviors. By gauging the fluctuation of the 
potency of four variables, the study of PiS’s adaptation preferences has revealed 
how its nationalist narrative has fed on the EU norms. Of course, the theory itself 
has limitations as well. As pointed out by Smith (1981: 202), the political adaptation 
theory is “not very good at prediction.” In this aspect, extending the political adapta-
tion theory to under party politics cannot circumvent this defect. Be that as it may, 
this article mainly examines the PiS’s past behaviors, and the analysis is inclined to 
delineate a tendency rather than to give a prediction.
Furthermore, mainly due to the lengthy low turnout, the political adaptation the-
ory cannot be rigidly applied to understand Poland’s party politics. In this aspect, 
as displayed in the article, the adaptation theory loosely applied can be taken as an 
acceptable tradeoff for the insight that it has revealed.
The EU is a normative power and its influence should be understood as a 
three-stage process, namely, norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). In this reading, the EU’s impact evaluated at 
different stages is likely to lead to different conclusions. That being so, although 
the internalization of EU norms still asks for more time, the EU’s pivotal roles have 
been attested in the stages of norm emergence and cascade. To further exploit the 
potential of EU norms, the following two points should be kept in mind.
Firstly, although the EU has no mandate to intervene member states’ party poli-
tics, it can, however, make them more compatible with political parties’ particular 
interests. In this regard, it is not easy, but not impossible, to balance between the 
EU’s cosmopolitan norms and political parties’ parochial interests. In any event, 
the EU is known for its capability of policy innovation. Apart from such capabil-
ity, the urgency of doing so has also kept the policy innovation on the front burner. 
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Alongside the growing decoupling of economic development and political condi-
tionality, the EU should not be complacent with its economic governance anymore.
Secondly, a healthy civil society is conducive to hold a ruling party or a party 
coalition accountable. Civil society is a decisive part of societal variables, and the 
restoration of civil society can affect political parties’ adaptation preferences bot-
tom-up. Different from the direct and quick authority emanating from legally bind-
ing mandates, the civil society approach is slow but steady. In any event, so long as 
political parties have to draw their legitimacy in the domestic arena, the civil society 
can play such a role.
In describing the institutional design in the post-communist societies, Elster et al. 
(1998) analogized it to the rebuild of a ship at sea. In the ship-rebuilding process, 
although political parties play a steering role, the EU’s impact is not necessarily lim-
ited. Furthermore, the EU, as an epistemic community, can make its norms congru-
ent with political parties’ interests, “and this is more likely to happen during a crisis, 
when knowledge promises better solutions to old problems” (Haas 1990: 45).
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